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Complexity and Self-Sustainment in Disaster Response Supply Chains 
ABSTRACT 
 
Governmental organizations play a major role in disaster relief operations.  Supply chains 
set up to respond to disasters differ dramatically in many dimensions that affect the cost 
of relief efforts.  One factor that has been described recently is self-sustainment, which 
occurs when supplies consumed by intermediate stages of a supply chain must be 
provided via the chain itself because they are not locally available.  This paper applies the 
concept of self-sustainment to response supply chains.  A mathematical model of a self-
sustaining response supply chain is developed.  Analysis of this model yields insights 
about the relationships and interactions among self-sustainment, speed of disaster onset, 




Disasters in the recent years have offered many poignant lessons for governmental 
organizations. One of them is the economic reality of the cost of a disaster. The cost has 
risen dramatically, from US$16.1B/year in 1992-2001 to US$40B/year in 2002-2011 
(Jones, 2013) and military logistics also contributes substantially to disaster response 
(Kress, 2002). Disaster relief consists predominantly of logistics and operations (Van 
Wassenhove, 2005; Thomas & Mizushima, 2005). Humanitarian logistics has been 
defined as “that special branch of logistics which manages response supply chain of 
critical supplies and services with challenges such as demand surges, uncertain supplies, 
critical time-windows in face of infrastructure vulnerabilities and vast scope and size of 
the operations” (Apte, 2009).   
 Disaster-response supply chains are generally much less efficient than 
commercial supply chains for many reasons, among them rapid set-up, short duration, 
limitations on infrastructure, and frequent changes and unpredictability in supply, 
demand and network configuration. A further driver of the relatively high cost of 
disaster-response operations is that, by their very nature, they often occur in regions 
where local infrastructure cannot be counted on to provide basic supplies like fuel and 
food and water for logistics personnel at the locations where they are required. In most 
supply chain models, the availability of the supplies for logistics activities is not modeled 
– implicitly, it is assumed that they are available at constant commercial prices. However, 
for response supply chains in disaster-struck regions this presumption does not hold true.  
We define a self-sustaining response supply chain (SSRSC) as a supply chain that 
is set up in response to a disaster, where resources that are not locally available are 
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consumed in intermediate stages and hence must be supplied through the chain itself. In a 
self-sustaining supply chain, the amount of resources that must be delivered at the 
beginning of the supply chain is substantially larger than the amount delivered to the 
ultimate consumer at the end of the supply chain. Due to this ‘multiplier effect,’ it has 
been shown that self-sustaining supply chains require more resources, manpower and 
equipment than locally supplied supply chains, resulting in significantly higher cost  
(Regnier, Simon, & Nussbaum, 2012; Regnier, Simon, Nussbaum, & Whitney, 2014).  
Given that for every dollar spent in preparing for a disaster, seven dollars are 
saved during response (United Nations, 2007; World Meteorological Organization, 
2010), an important lesson learned from recent disasters is to be prepared. Practitioners 
(Eisner, 2007; Fenton, 2008; Nelan, 2008) and scholars (Van Wassenhove, 2005; Kovács 
& Spens, 2007; Holguín-Veras, Jaller, & Wachtendorf, 2012; Celik, Ergun, Johnson, 
Keskinocak, Lorca, Pekgun, & Swann, 2012) agree that preparation is a significant part 
of a relief effort. To identify the most cost-effective preparations, it is critical to 
understand their true cost-saving impact in complex disaster-response operations. For 
example, resource-efficient transportation platforms such as amphibious vehicles may be 
more cost-effective than helicopters, especially in complex, self-sustaining operations. 
The capability of rapidly replacing nonfunctional infrastructure with workable structures 
such as portable bridges might also improve the supply chain’s resource-efficiency and 
cost effectiveness. 
We investigate the impact of self-sustainment and complexity of the humanitarian 
response on the cost of operating SSRSCs. Disasters have been classified using the level 
of difficulty potentially present in humanitarian operations (Apte, 2009). The two 
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dimensions for this classification are time (speed of onset) and location (dispersion) as 
classified by Apte and Yoho (2011) and reproduced in Figure 1. Our objective in this 
study is to investigate the impact of complexity on the cost in a self-sustaining supply 
chain, as a consequence of difficulty in humanitarian operations due to speed of onset and 
geographical dispersion. Given the focus of our research, our contribution is towards 
strategic planning rather than operational decision-making.  
 
 Figure 1: Classification of Disasters and Operational Complexity 
We propose a model for costs of a SSRSC and use it to show that the total cost of 
operating a SSRSC increases based on the level of difficulty as described in Figure 1, and 
verify that there is a positive interaction effect between speed of onset and dispersion. We 
also show that self-sustainment is a driver of cost and its impact is higher for more 
complex supply chains. We believe these insights into the cost impact of self-
sustainment, further influenced by speed of onset as well as dispersion of the disaster, 
will facilitate better decision making. With many competing demands for resources, a 






















  The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the literature for 
sustainable supply chains and response supply chains. Section 3 describes the problem, 
and Section 4 develops and identifies the model. In Section 5 we present the results, and 
in Section 6 we offer the conclusion.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Our work synthesizes ideas from response supply chains and from self-sustainment. 
Supply chains in general have received substantial attention with the primary goal of 
unveiling the underlying causes for significant costs in any operation, in all sectors, 
private or public (Chopra & Meindl, 2013; Jacobs & Chase, 2013). The emphasis is often 
on demand uncertainties (Lee, 2002) and optimal distribution across a stable existing 
network (Chopra, 2003; Robeson & Copacino, 1994). For stable networks, optimization 
models are usually designed to balance cost with flexibility in managing significant 
disruptions in the supply network (Lim, Bassamboo, Chopra, & Daskin, 2008).  
Recently, environmental legislation and social consciousness have shifted the 
focus to the closed loop and sustainability in supply chain management, leading to 
increased consideration of the environment and existing resources as factors in supply 
chain analysis (Ferguson & Souza, 2010; McKinnon et al., 2010). Walmart has been 
influential in bringing sustainability into the mainstream of supply chain management 
(Plambeck & Denend, 2010), illustrating the trend of companies realizing that profits and 
sustainability can co-occur.  
Sustainability has been gaining traction in popular literature (McDonough & 
Braungart, 2010) as well as in academic literature (Seliger, 2007; Dey, LaGuardia, & 
Srinivasan, 2011; Wang & Gupta, 2011; McKinnon, Browne, & Whiteing, 2012). 
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Sustainable supply chains often achieve better short and long-term performance through 
reduction, reuse, and recycling—the latter two “R’s” are often performed outside of the 
traditional supply chain (Kleindorfer, Singhal, & Van Wassenhove, 2005).  
Sustainability is often achieved through a closed-loop supply chain (Guide & Van 
Wassenhove, 2009). In closed-loop supply chains, goods are refurbished or 
remanufactured after their initial use. Analyzing these supply chains requires expanding 
the perspective on resources – for example, goods once delivered may become inputs to 
further production – and a broader perspective on the supply chain. Cost can no longer be 
the only measure of resource requirements in the network, and therefore closing the loop 
requires additional modeling complexity.  
Similarly, self-sustaining supply chains require a broader analysis than traditional 
supply chains, as models must account for the provision of the supplies and manpower 
consumed by logistics activities, which may not be assumed to be procured on the local 
commercial market. By definition, self-sustaining supply chains require that resources 
consumed while transporting supplies to their destinations be provided via the supply 
chain itself.  Researchers (Dubbs, 2011; Hathorn, 2013; Regnier & Nussbaum, 2011) 
have identified the multiplicative effects of additional transportation distance and 
additional stages on cost in such situations. Self-sustaining supply chains occur 
commonly in military operations in austere environments, particularly in the early stages 
(Regnier et al., 2014).  
Response supply chains are often set up and operated in extreme conditions in 
response to a crisis (Coombs, 1999). Whybark, Melnyk, Day, and Davis (2010) discussed 
the new realities and management challenges for disaster relief supply chains that 
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function under extreme conditions. Private sector supply chain managers may get 
discouraged in these situations; however, there are lessons to be learned from them (Van 
Wassenhove, 2006). These supply chains in severe environments have to be researched 
for better planning. 
Disaster response supply chains must be set up quickly with existing and available 
resources such as information and manpower (Dash et al., 2013), while the objective to 
minimize cost is always relevant. Apte (2009) provided a detailed look at the various 
forces at play in response supply chains. The field of response supply chains has been 
getting more attention as researchers identify the complexities involved in rescue 
operations. For example, Pedraza Martinez, Stapleton, and Van Wassenhove (2011) 
applied fleet management techniques to response supply chains.  Guide and Van 
Wassenhove (2003) highlight the fact that disaster relief is an important and 
complementary area of study to sustainable supply chains. 
 To measure the cost incurred as a function of the level of complexity in a self-
sustaining supply chain, it is important to be able to compute the ‘real’ fully burdened 
cost of resources as they are consumed and distributed across the supply chain. The 
impact of self-sustainment for logistics activities and the fully burdened cost associated 
with it is described by Regnier et al. (2014), which introduces terms such as ‘self-
sustaining supply networks’ and ‘fuel multiplier.’ The underestimation of the costs in one 
particular resource – fuel – is critical to the United States Department of Defense.  
3. THE PROBLEM 
Our problem posits a supply network with three node types: Sources, coordination 
(warehousing) nodes, and demand nodes. Figure 2 shows the supply network with 
 9 
 
supplies sourced from outside the affected region, transported through coordination 
nodes, and delivered to meet demand in the affected region. We use the term austere, as 
in Figure 2, to refer to the region in which supplies are not available commercially and 
must be provided by the supply chain. Austerity is common in post-disaster 
environments, and therefore self-sustainment is often required. An open question is what 
impact the characteristics of disaster-response supply chains, such as speed and 
dispersion, have in a self-sustaining supply chain. 
 The source nodes supply resources such as water, food, and fuel. There may be 
many source nodes because there are different resources from suppliers, such as the 
franchises of Nutriset in several countries that produce and supply Plumpy’Nut to the 
malnourished children in the Horn of Africa through UNICEF (Swaminathan, 2009). 
There may also be different supply nodes because there are many donors. At coordination 
nodes, provisions or emergency supplies can be warehoused or handed off to be sent to 
the affected regions. Coordination node operations resemble the military practice of 
warehousing and coordinating defense inventory ashore or at sea to be used in the event 




Figure 2: The supply network 
The demand nodes make up the affected region; the intended consumers receive 
the transported resources at the demand nodes. When Hurricane Sandy left thousands of 
New Yorkers starving, the National Guard ended up providing 2.1 million Meals Ready 
to Eat (MREs) and more than 1 million bottles of water (Gibbs & Holloway, 2013) that 
were sourced from outside the region. In our network, the demand nodes may be grouped 
by region with coordination points within the region, as in a dispersed disaster that may 
cover many municipalities or countries. 
Connecting nodes are arcs that represent the activities that are required to move 
resources from the originating node to the arc’s destination node. This may involve 
convoy operations, including unloading, handling, distribution, and coordination 
activities at the destination node.   
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Disasters have been classified based on speed of onset and source (Van 
Wassenhove, 2005; Ergun, Heier, & Swann, 2008). In this research we use the 
classification given by Apte (2009) that is based on speed of onset and geographical 
dispersion. Sudden-onset and highly dispersed disasters have greater complexity in 
response operations due to lack of lead time and area affected.  
3.1 Geographical Dispersion 
Localized disasters can be distinguished from dispersed disasters on the basis of 
number of administrative entities, such as countries, states, or cities, across the affected 
geographical area (Apte & Yoho, 2011). A disaster affecting many municipalities, or 
even countries, will have a much larger geographical dispersion than a disaster striking a 
city or other small, administratively unified region. The large and scattered demand may 
increase the need for coordination among organizations, thus increasing the complexity 
of operations.  
 A supply network may also have many supply and coordinating nodes or long 
distances between them. One of the consequences of the modern highly dispersed supply 
chain is that many suppliers know little about where the items they provide come from 
(Fisher, 2011). In the case of a response supply chain with extreme characteristics of 
demand, supply, and infrastructure, this lack of understanding compounds the 
complexities. However, our focus in this work is primarily on geographical dispersion as 
it relates to affected area.  
For example, the Indian Ocean Tsunami occurred in 2004 as a result of 9.1 
magnitude earthquake and ended up taking 227,000 lives. More than 1.5 million persons 
were displaced in 12 countries. This disaster is classified as a highly dispersed disaster. 
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Although the damages occurred along the coastal region, they were spread across many 
countries, making the last-mile distribution efforts very challenging. On the other hand, 
Hurricane Katrina and the 2010 Haiti earthquake were localized, relative to the 2004 
Indian Ocean Tsunami.  
3.2 Speed of Onset 
A sudden-onset disaster may be operationally complex even if it is localized because the 
short lead time prevents relief providers from preparing. On the other hand, for slow-
onset disasters such as pandemic or famine, there can be more time to educate the public, 
identify and prepare distribution and coordination facilities, and pre-position appropriate 
inventory. In a slow-onset disaster, the supply network can incorporate economies of 
scale, as by using larger convoys and larger lot sizes due to the available lead time. In a 
sudden-onset disaster, shorter lead times, especially for resources such as food (Fisher, 
2007), are necessitated due to the urgency and uncertainty of demand. Convoys may not 
always be full when deployed. Moreover, the food shortages caused by the disaster may 
force involving more out-of-region suppliers (Mahanta, 2013), leading to more and 
longer trips.  Routing in response supply chains, in case of sudden-onset disasters, is 
difficult due to high and urgent demand, which often leads to repeated visits by vehicles, 
perhaps at the same destination, due to split deliveries (Ozdamar, 2013). In addition, 
damaged infrastructure may force longer routes despite the urgency of the demand. 
For example, an earthquake is classified as a sudden-onset disaster; it strikes with 
almost no warning, making it difficult to provide immediate relief. A slow-onset disaster 
offers some advance notice, as in the case of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. It was known 
days in advance that the landfall might be in New Orleans. This allowed for some 
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preparation, though it was deemed inferior from lessons learned subsequently (Holguin-
Veras, Perez, Ukkusuri, Wachtendorf, & Brown, 2007).  
3.3 Self-Sustainment 
On many occasions, when a disaster strikes, basic supplies such as water become 
unavailable. We define the supply network, or the response supply chain, to be ‘self-
sustaining’ if resources consumed by the relief activities must be provided through the 
supply network itself.  The multiplier effect occurs when, due to self-sustainment in an 
austere region, the total resource requirement is substantially larger than the enduser 
demand. As first noted by Regnier & Nussbaum (2011), if the fuel required by 
transportation vehicles must be transported by the supply chain, then a naïve cost 
estimate of a multistage supply chain will underestimate the true cost of supplying the 
enduser.  Equivalently, the fuel delivered to the enduser will be substantially less than the 
total fuel entering the chain. Figure 3 (Figure 1 from Regnier & Nussbaum (2011)) 
illustrates this in an example with a three-stage supply chain consuming and delivering a 
single resource – fuel. The consumption by the three stages is, respectively, 15%, 30%, 
and 20% of the amount delivered. To deliver 1000 gallons of fuel at the end of the supply 
chain, the initial supply must be 1794 gallons. This result demonstrates the multiplier 
effect. The multiplier for a given stage is an increasing and convex function of distance 





Figure 3. An Illustration of the Fuel Multiplier in a Self-Sustaining Supply Chain. 
Adapted from Regnier and Nussbaum (2011). 
 Dubbs (2011) and Hathorn (2013) estimated the fuel multiplier in real supply 
chains. Dubbs (2011) estimated that in Helmand Province in Afghanistan, the supply 
chain from Camp Leatherneck to a remote forward operating base consumed 72% as 
much fuel as it delivered. While sea-based transportation is generally more efficient, 
Hathorn (2013) estimated that, depending on the convoy composition, a supply route 
from San Diego to the Spratly Islands may consume 25% to more than 90% as much 
supply as it delivers to the warfighting vessel. In these models, the enduser is assumed to 
be a warfighting unit rather than a disaster-affected population, but the concept and 
impact of self-sustainment are the same. 
4. MODEL 
To explore the cost impact of speed of onset and dispersion in a SSSRC, we developed a 
mathematical model of SSSRCs. In our model, resources are transported from supply 
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Each arc is characterized by its resource consumption, to include consumption by 
activities such as unloading and distribution at the destination node.  
To simplify the exposition, all resources are measured in standardized units, 
which may be thought of as volume or weight. It is further assumed that the appropriate 
proportions of various resources are transported on each stage. Relaxing this assumption 
would make each stage less efficient, and therefore further increase the cost impact of 
dispersion, speed of onset, and self-sustainment. In addition, all demand and consumption 
parameters are normalized to a fixed time interval which may be periodic (e.g. per day or 
per week) or to cover the entire period during which the SSRSC operates in the given 
configuration.  
 In general, a response supply chain becomes self-sustaining only in the affected 
region, which is often austere. Therefore, although we could model the impact of 
dispersion and speed of onset in the sources and warehouse/coordination portions of the 
supply network, we focus primarily on complexity in the portion of the supply network in 
the affected region, i.e. demand nodes and the arcs originating at coordination nodes. 
Our model uses the following parameters: 
:  total demand in region k 
:  number of demand centers in region k 
az :  round-trip distance on arc a 
:  total capacity per trip on arc a 







:  amount delivered per trip on arc a, note that  
:  frequency of deliveries on arc a 
:  average per-unit cost of resources 
Arcs may be differentiated by type,  , , ,a s S w W l L    , as illustrated in 
Figure 2, where S is the set of arcs from a supply node to a coordination node, W is the 
set of arcs from a coordination node to a demand transshipment node, and L is the set of 
arcs within the austere region from a demand transshipment node to a demand center.   
To investigate the increased costs of such supply chains, it is useful to compute a 
multiplier for any given arc a, denoted . The multiplier specifies the amount of 
resources that must be delivered to the beginning of the arc per unit delivered to the end 
of the arc. If the resources consumed on arc a can be purchased or produced locally over 
the arc, then ; the only resources transported to the beginning of arc a are those 
which must be delivered to the end.  However, if the resources consumed on arc a are not 
locally available, then .  In the latter case, we can compute 
 
based on parameters 
of the arc.  If the transport vehicles are full at the start of the trip, then a a a aq p r z  , and 









If the transport vehicles are not filled to capacity, then a a a aq p r z  , and the multiplier 
is instead computed as: 















 . (2) 
 (Note that these two expressions are equivalent for 
a a a aq p r z  .)  The total cost  
associated with delivering each unit of supply to demand center  from supply node s 
through warehouse node w (and the transshipment node in the region of demand center l) 
can then be expressed as: 
 .  (3) 
The multiplier effect shown in (3) is caused by increased demands at intermediate nodes 
necessitating an increased number of round trips in earlier stages. The expression in (3) 
applies only when the total amount of resources supplied by the chain is large and many 
round-trips on each arc are required to meet demand.  
 As discussed earlier, speed of onset has multiple effects on the supply network, 
including smaller, partial, or poorly targeted loads and other inefficiencies.  We 
operationalize speed of onset in this model in terms of ,lu l L , the frequency of 
deliveries required to the demand nodes.  One way that frequency of deliveries affects 
costs is by decreasing the amount  delivered per trip on each arc — at least on the final 
arc, from transshipment node to demand center.  For the focus of this paper, we will 
assume that  is equal for all  within region k, and that demand at each node is equal 
within region k (both  and  can be thought of as averages over region k).  If the total 





  for all l L  within region k. 
swlC
l







 A second impact of speed of onset is on the efficiency parameter .  Sudden-
onset disasters may require the use of inefficient but available transportation assets, 
which would lead to larger value of .  We do not offer a specific functional form for 
these effects that would be difficult to generalize across disaster scenarios; instead we 
model this by assuming that: 





  . (4) 
 Dispersion also affects some of the parameters in the model.  We model greater 
dispersion as reflecting a larger number of demand centers 
kn  in a given region and/or 
longer distances ,lz l L  within the region. 
5. RESULTS 
We consider the impact of the two components of complexity – speed of onset and 
dispersion – along with sustainment on the total cost per unit of supply delivered to a 
demand node by the supply network. To explore these relationships, we first analyze the 
qualitative impacts of the complexity parameters ,l lu z  and kn  and then present a 
numerical example. 
 Complexity affects cost in (3) via the multiplier on . Thus we will first show 
that there is a positive linear relationship between  (or any single-arc multiplier) and 
total per unit cost.  This is straightforward; we observe that the first derivative of swlC  
with respect to l  is positive, and the second derivative is zero: 






















 .  (6) 
Speed of Onset 
Recall that speed of onset increases the frequency  of deliveries to demand nodes, and 
leads to a smaller amount delivered per trip, as well as an increase in consumption rate  
(and perhaps increased consumption rate on earlier arcs as well).  We can obtain an 
expression for  that includes speed of onset by substituting the expression for 
lq  into 
(2), and noting that 
lr  is a function of lu : 
 
   
k
l l l










  .  (7) 
We can then differentiate (7) with respect to 
lu  to obtain the relationship between  and 
the frequency of deliveries, recalling that  l lr u  is positive: 
 
          
2
0
k k l l l l l l k l l l l l ll
l k k
Q n z u r u r u n z u r u r ud
du Q Q
    
   .  (8) 
That is, an increase in the speed of onset with which resources must be delivered results 








Greater dispersion in the demand region is reflected in larger values of both 
lz  and .  
We can compute the effect of each change on  by differentiating the expression given 
in (7) by 




l k l ll
l k
u n r ud
dz Q






l l l ll
k k
u r u zd
dn Q

  .  (10) 
Thus, each parameter change results in an increase of the final-arc multiplier.  However, 
differentiating the expression in (7) by both parameters reveals that there is also a 









  .  (11) 
Thus, total per unit cost is not only increasing in both 
lz  and , but is increasing at a 
faster rate in each one when the other is larger.  This is perhaps not a surprising result, but 
it helps validate the nature of the relationship between dispersion and cost analytically. 
Complexity 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the most difficult and hence complex humanitarian operations 
are in response to disasters which are both dispersed and sudden-onset, and thus combine 
the effects of the two factors just discussed.  We find that, just as there was a positive 







between dispersion and speed of onset. This result is obtained by differentiating the 
expression in (7) with respect to both 
lu  and either  or lz : 
 
    2
0
l l l l l ll
l k k
z u r u r ud
du dn Q
  
  ,  (12) 
or similarly:  
 
    2
0
k l l l l ll
l l k
n u r u r ud
du dz Q
  
  .  (13) 
Self-Sustainment 
In this section thus far, we have considered only the impact of speed of onset and 
dispersion on the final-arc multiplier  and the proportionate impact on total cost.  
However, the multiplier effect in a multistage network further amplifies resource 
requirements and supply costs associated with self-sustaining networks.  If the arc from 
the warehouse to the demand transshipment node is also self-sustaining, then .  We 
can obtain an expression for this multiplier using the same approach as was used for . 
The two differences here are that no term for the number of demand centers is needed, 
and the total demand must be multiplied by  to account for the resources consumed by 
the vehicles on subsequent arcs. 
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l k
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l k w w w ww
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l k l k
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  .  (14) 
 As observed earlier for the final arc, an increased speed of onset will result in a 









consumption rate .  As done previously for the final arc, we can find the impact of an 
increased speed of onset by differentiating (14) with respect to : 
 
    
0
w w w w w ww
w l k





  . (15) 
Thus, an increase in speed of onset results in an increase in both  and .  This is 
noteworthy, because yet another positive interaction arises; differentiating (3) with 










  .  (16) 
Therefore, for a multi-stage SSRSC, increased speed of onset is likely to have a 
considerable impact on total per unit cost. 
Numerical Example 
To explore the effects of complexity, we consider a numerical example with four cases: 
localized with slow-onset, localized with sudden-onset, dispersed with slow-onset, and 
dispersed with sudden-onset, with parameters shown in Table 1.  We assume that 
resources are locally available only on the first stage, hence 1s   and , 1w l   . 
 Using the formulas in this section, together with (2) and (3), we can compute 
,w l  , and swlC  for each case. Note that in this example, for each case and for every arc 
a , a a a aq p r z  , hence (2) is used instead of (1). 
Table 1 illustrates the relationships between speed of onset, geographical 
dispersion, and per unit costs. The per unit costs are higher in the dispersed cases and in 






the per unit price of resources at the start of the chain is 1, the additional per unit cost due 
to the resource consumption of the supply chain is 0.20 in the localized & slow-onset 
case, and 2.00 in the dispersed & sudden-onset case. That is, ten times more resources are 
consumed by logistics activities in the dispersed with sudden-onset disasters.  
 




0.1w lr r   
10w lu u   
Sudden-onset 
0.2w lr r   










50lz   
8kn   
1.07w   
1.40l   
1.50swlC   
1.15w   
2.60l   
3.00swlC   
Localized 
25lz   
4kn   
1.09w   
1.10l   
1.20swlC   
1.29w   
1.40l   
1.80swlC   
Table 1.  Numerical example showing the impacts of speed of onset and 
geographical dispersion on per unit costs between four hypothetical self-sustaining 
response supply chains. In this example, total demand 1000kQ  ; round-trip arc 
distances on the first two stages are 100s wz z  ; per-trip vehicle capacities are 
200, 100s w lp p p   , and the average per unit cost of resources 1c  . 
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The results of the numerical example demonstrate quantitatively the qualitative 
relationship suggested in Figure 1; the total per unit cost increases as the complexity due 
to increased difficulty of humanitarian operations increases. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Humanitarian operations are especially challenging –and costly–for reasons described 
earlier. The multiplier effect associated with self-sustainment, previously unexamined in 
the disaster response literature, contributes to the higher cost relative to traditional supply 
chains, since portions of disaster relief supply chains operate within austere regions. We 
find that the multiplier effect of self-sustainment not only adds to but compounds the cost 
impact of complexity – in terms of speed of onset and geographical dispersion. There is a 
positive interaction effect on cost between the two components of complexity, as well as 
between complexity and self-sustainment, indicating that logistical operations in complex 
self-sustaining disaster response supply chains will consume far more resources than a 
naïve model would predict. 
 This suggests that investments in resource-efficiency of disaster response logistics 
are especially valuable, and that certain categories of investments are more valuable than 
they would appear if the self-sustainment multiplier effect is neglected. A naïve cost-
benefit analysis comparing two transportation platforms or two designs of coordination 
operations would compare the cost impact on a single arc in isolation. Our analysis shows 
that resource demands associated with logistics operations are more important than 
planners may realize, because in a self-sustaining supply chain, those resources incur 
indirect costs of transport to their point of use. A platform, such as an amphibious vessel, 
that has a high up-front cost but a relatively lower operational resource requirement, may 
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be more cost-effective than a cheaper but more resource-intensive option. To capture the 
benefits of such a platform fully in an analysis, it is necessary to have a model of the 
likely environments in which the platform will be used. If it is likely to be used in 
complex self-sustaining supply chains, the benefits of improved efficiency will be far 
greater than they might immediately appear. 
Planners typically have no control over the speed of onset of a disaster. However, 
they may be able to mitigate its impact on logistical costs. The cost increases we 
observed for sudden-onset disasters were due to more frequent deliveries of supplies and 
greater resource consumption due to vehicles and convoys not being fully loaded. Pre-
positioning vehicles and/or supplies to be able to respond to sudden spikes in demand 
more efficiently could reduce the magnitude of these effects. 
Regarding dispersion, our focus in this research was specifically on geographical 
dispersion. However, dispersion may not necessarily be geographical; it may involve 
other issues, since many entities such as government, non-government, and military 
organizations, along with private sector organizations, can be involved in humanitarian 
operations. These organizations may have different mission objectives and political 
motivations, and coordination among these players of the response supply chains would 
thus add another level of complexity to the logistics operations. These types of 
organizational dispersion are unlikely to affect physical arc distances, but are likely to 
involve more demand centers. In addition, they are likely to have many of the same 
impacts associated with greater speed of onset. Coordination challenges may lead to 
smaller convoys and smaller lot sizes, and thus to deliveries that are more frequent and 
less efficient. The magnitude of the impact on resource consumption will vary depending 
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on the particular situation, but the overall qualitative impact is similar to that of 
geographical dispersion: it increases the additional resource demand imposed by self-
sustainment. 
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